CASE DIGEST - BICOL MEDICAL CENTER V. BOTOR ET.AL G.R. No. 214073 04 October 2017 Leonen, J.:

BICOL MEDICAL CENTER V. BOTOR ET.AL

G.R. No. 214073 

04 October 2017

Leonen, J.: 

Doctrine: 

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued: 

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; 

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; 

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 

Facts: 

BMC Chief ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound. This resulted in the closure of steel gates for vehicles and pedestrians relocating the same. Thus, Atty. Botor asked for the reopening or dismantling of the gate being a public nuisance. The Sanguniang Panglungsod of Naga authorized the Mayor to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling the gate, the Mayor filed a verified petition with prayer for a writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC. RTC then denied the application for injunctive reflief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the same and emphasized that only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an application for writ of injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the injunction was directed against the relocation of the service road and gate closure. 

Issue: 

Whether the Court of Appeals erred directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the closure of the Road. 

Ruling: 

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to: 

[P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. 

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued: 

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established: 

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of: or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; 

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or 

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued: 

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; 

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; 

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. 

In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits." 

Tan v. Hosana defines prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the· party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient." 

Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank then discussed the requisites and the proof required for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction: 

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction. 

However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The plaintiffs arc only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided. 

To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before the trial court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines Sur. Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3.

Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use Road Lot No. 3, a public road. 

On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693, which covered a total land area of 53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693. 

BMC likewise presented a certificate from the City Engineer of Naga City which read: 

This is to certify that the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of Bicol Medical Center is not included in the list of Inventory of City Road[s] of Naga City. 

Given this 14th day of December 2012 for record and reference purposes. 

A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of BMC was not included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's control. 

Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or respondents should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road Lot No. 3. 

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. explained that a clear legal right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief." 

Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over Road Lot No. 3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right to use and enjoy this property, must be respected. 

Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into a right.