CASE DIGEST: Fule v. CA; G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

Fule v. CA

G.R. No. L-40502

November 29, 1976

Martin, J.:

 

 

Doctrine: The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it is merely constitutive of venue.

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence". It should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.

 

Facts:

Virginia Fule filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI of Laguna, Calamba(now RTC). She alleged that Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in Manila where he left real estate and personal properties in C. Lagunaa and in other places within the court’s jurisdiction.

 

Likewise, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administrator (SA) over the estate. Which was granted.

 

However, Preciosa Garcia move for reconsideration contenting that the said appointment was made without jurisdiction. Considering that there was no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate and there has been no delay for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Garcia. Thus, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix instead Fule, who is only the debtor of Garcia’s estate.

 

Pending such MR, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as the SA since she has an adverse interest against the estate. Thus, she is unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

 

Meanwhile, the notice of hearing for Fule’s petition was published, Preciosa, then received a supplemental petition for the appointment of Regular Administrator by Fule. Thus, Preciosa moved for opposition raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest, and disqualification of Fule.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia:

1. to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia;

2. to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;

3. to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia.

However, the court dismissed Preciosa’s motion to dismiss. It held that that Preciosa had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

During hearing, Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. However, Fule testified that Fule also testified that the decedent was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

 

This prompted Preciosa to file a petition on certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. The CA then annulled the proceedings before the lower court for lack of jurisdiction. Fule then moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence this present petition.

 

On the other hand, Fule filed a petition for certiorari with tro.

 

Issues: 

1. Whether the Fule’s petition failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laid the venue.

2. Whether the residence of the decedent at the time of his death speaks of jurisdiction of the court or venue cases of the settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration.

 

Ruling: The residence of the decedent at the time of his death speaks of the venue in cases of the settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration.

 

Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised.

 

The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

 

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposely fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. The place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue.

 

What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?

The Supreme Court then explains that term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.

In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

The term "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.

Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

 

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.

 

xxx

 

The Supreme Court likewise rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed.