CASE DIGEST - Republic v Luzon Stevedoring Corp.; GR L-21749 J. JBL, Reyes; 29 September 1967

CASO FORTUITOUS

Republic v Luzon Stevedoring Corp.; GR L-21749

J. JBL, Reyes; 29 September 1967

DOCTRINE: The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.

FACTS:

Barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero"¹ also belonging to the same corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list.

The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces. Republic of the Philippines sued defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees.

However, the defendant disclaimed the liability. It alleged that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees and that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majure and the plaintiff has no capacity to sue. Lastly, it averred that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.

The RTC held defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees. Thus, it appealed directly before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure?

RULING:

Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it.

For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used.

In Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule.

For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines).

It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.

The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola circunstancia de que su existencia haga mas dificil o mas onerosa la accion diligente del presento ofensor" The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

Otherwise stated, the appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient.

Hence, the lower Court committed no error in holding it negligent in not suspending operations and in holding it liable for the damages caused.