CASE DIGEST - Far Eastern Shipping Company V. CA; G.R. No. 130068 J. Regalado; 01 October 1998
COMPULSORY PILOTAGE
Far Eastern Shipping Company V. CA; G.R. No. 130068
J. Regalado; 01 October 1998
DOCTRINE: The pilot does not take entire
charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage
is compulsory.
FACTS:
The M/V PAVLODAR, flying
under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping
Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia
at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the
Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was
tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the
vessel.
Appellant Senen Gavino was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4. Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside
him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel
and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was
ideal for docking maneuvers.
When the vessel reached the landmark one-half mile from the pier, Gavino
ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from
the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the
crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the
vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members.
A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When
Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that
there was nothing to it. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take
hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier
apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino
thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the
apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained
damage too.Thus, Kavankov filed his sea protest. Then, Gavino submitted his
report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports
Authority. Likewise, Abellana submitted his report of the incident.
Per contract and supplemental
contract of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and the contractor for the
rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports
Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. Thus, PPA
filed a complaint for a sum of money against Far
Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to
pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00 representing actual damages and the
costs of suit. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the CA affirmed the
findings of the lower court except that it
found no employer-employee relationship existing between herein private
respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA, for short) and Capt. Gavino.
Thus, CA, ruled instead that the
liability of MPA is anchored on the provisions of Customs Administrative Order
No. 15-65, and accordingly modified the trial court’s decision by holding MPA,
along with its co-defendants therein, still solidarily liable to PPA but
entitled MPA to reimbursement from Capt. Gavino for such amount of the adjudged
pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to seventy-five percent
(75%) of its prescribed reserve fund. Hence,
the present consolidated cases.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the Pilot
of a commercial vessel, under the compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the
damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his
negligence.
2.
Is the owner of
the vessel liable if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of the
master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
RULING:
1.
Generally, the pilot supersedes the
master for the time being in the command and navigation of the ship, and his
orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation.
He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all
directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and
the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is
compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel,
or to decline to act as pilot.
Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire
charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who
retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage
is compulsory.
It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory
pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their
ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under
local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly
acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and
thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation.
Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to
the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a
pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation
in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to
be trusted than that of the master.
He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must
have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances,
and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
In this case, Capt. Gavino failed
to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots
in the performance of their duties. As the pilot, he should have made sure that
his directions were promptly and strictly followed.
2.
The negligence on the part of Capt.
Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the allision.
His unconcerned lethargy as master of the ship in the face of troublous
exigence constitutes negligence.
While it is indubitable that in exercising his functions a pilot is in
sole command of the ship and supersedes the master for the time being in
the command and navigation of a ship and that he becomes master pro hac
vice of a vessel piloted by him, there is overwhelming authority to
the effect that the master does not surrender his vessel to the pilot and the
pilot is not the master.
The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence
of a pilot. There are occasions when the master may and should interfere and
even displace the pilot, as when the pilot is obviously incompetent or
intoxicated and the circumstances may require the master to displace a
compulsory pilot because of incompetency or physical incapacity. If, however,
the master does nor observe that a compulsory pilot is incompetent or
physically incapacitated, the master is justified in relying on the pilot, but
not blindly.
The master is not wholly absolved from his duties while a pilot is on
board his vessel, and may advise with or offer suggestions to him. He is still
in command of the vessel, except so far as her navigation is concerned, and
must cause the ordinary work of the vessel to be properly carried on and the
usual precaution taken. Thus, in particular, he is bound to see that there is
sufficient watch on deck, and that the men are attentive to their duties, also
that engines are stopped, towlines cast off, and the anchors clear and ready to
go at the pilot's order.
In sum, where a compulsory pilot is in charge of a ship, the master being
required to permit him to navigate it, if the master observes that the pilot is
incompetent or physically incapable, then it is the dury of the master to
refuse to permit the pilot to act. But if no such reasons are present,
then the master is justified in relying upon the pilot, but not blindly.
Under the circumstances of this case, if a situation arose where the
master, exercising that reasonable vigilance which the master of a ship should
exercise, observed, or should have observed, that the pilot was so navigating
the vessel that she was going, or was likely to go, into danger, and there was
in the exercise of reasonable care and vigilance an opportunity for the master
to intervene so as to save the ship from danger, the master should have acted
accordingly. 83 The master of a vessel must exercise a
degree of vigilance commensurate with the circumstances.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer
to the findings of the trial court, especially as this is affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. But even beyond that, our own evaluation is that Capt.
Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act
when the perilous situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive
action as master of the ship. In the face of imminent or actual danger, he did
not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or
overruling the pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt.
Gavino's decisions, and this is precisely the reason why he decided not to
countermand any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts found
Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov
was just as negligent as Capt. Gavino.
In general, a pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his own
negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for
damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the
performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort.
At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted
exclusively by the negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel
compulsorily. The exemption from liability for such negligence shall apply
if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is
responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held accountable
for damages proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be
anything which concurred with the fault of the pilot in producing the accident,
the vessel master and owners are liable.
The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts
of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a
compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable
therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute
the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not
in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even
though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the
injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the
owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does
not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The
rationale for this rule is that the master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge.
The master is not entirely absolved of the responsibility with respect to
navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge.
Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the
vessel or her owners are liable for all damaged caused by the negligence or
other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel.
As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a
vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused
to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.
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